According to state government sources, the rebellious militias gathered in the Naoshera-Islamabad area, attacking the state troops and their supply trucks. A battalion of state troops was dispatched, which cleared the roads and dispersed the militias. By September, order was reestablished. The Muslim Conference sources, on the other hand, narrate that hundreds of people were killed in Bagh
during flag hoisting around 15 August and that the Maharaja unleased a ‘reign of terror’ on 24 August. Local Muslims also told Richard Symonds, a British Quaker social worker, that the army fired on crowds, and burnt houses and villages indiscriminately. According to the Assistant British High Commissioner in Pakistan, H. S. Stephenson, “the Poonch affair… was greatly exaggerated”.
Description of Sino-Indian war of 1962 :
Tibet and the border dispute
The 1940s saw huge change in South Asia with the Partition of India
in 1947 (resulting in the establishment of the two new states of India and Pakistan
), and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) in 1949. One of the most basic policies for the new Indian government was that of maintaining cordial relations with China, reviving its ancient friendly ties. India was among the first nations to grant diplomatic recognition to the newly created PRC.
At the time, Chinese officials issued no condemnation of Nehru’s claims or made any opposition to Nehru’s open declarations of control over Aksai Chin. In 1956, Chinese PremierZhou Enlai
stated that he had no claims over Indian-controlled territory.
He later argued that Aksai Chin was already under Chinese jurisdiction and that the McCartney-MacDonald Line was the line China could accept.
Zhou later argued that as the boundary was undemarcated and had never been defined by treaty between any Chinese or Indian government, the Indian government could not unilaterally define Aksai Chin’s borders.
In 1950, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army took control of Tibet
, which all Chinese governments regarded as still part of China. Later the Chinese extended their influence by building a road in 1956–67
and placing border posts in Aksai Chin.
India found out after the road was completed, protested against these moves and decided to look for a diplomatic solution to ensure a stable Sino-Indian border.
To resolve any doubts about the Indian position, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru
declared in parliament that India regarded the McMahon Line as its official border.
The Chinese expressed no concern at this statement,
and in 1951 and 1952, the government of China asserted that there were no frontier issues to be taken up with India.
In 1954, Prime Minister Nehru wrote a memo calling for India’s borders to be clearly defined and demarcated;
in line with previous Indian philosophy, Indian maps showed a border that, in some places, lay north of the McMahon Line.
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai
, in November 1956, again repeated Chinese assurances that the People’s Republic had no claims on Indian territory, although official Chinese maps showed 120,000 square kilometres (46,000 sq mi) of territory claimed by India as Chinese. CIA
documents created at the time revealed that Nehru had ignored Burmese
premier Ba Swe
when he warned Nehru to be cautious when dealing with Zhou.
They also allege that Zhou purposefully told Nehru that there were no border issues with India.
In 1954, China and India negotiated the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence
, by which the two nations agreed to abide in settling their disputes. India presented a frontier map which was accepted by China, and the slogan Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai
(Indians and Chinese are brothers) was popular then. However, Nehru in 1958, had privately told G. Parthasarathi
, the Indian envoy to China not to trust the Chinese at all and send all communications directly to him, bypassing the Defence Minister VK Krishna Menon
since his communist background clouded his thinking about China.
According to Georgia Tech
scholar John W Garver
, Nehru’s policy on Tibet was to create a strong Sino-Indian partnership which would be catalysed through agreement and compromise on Tibet. Garver believes that Nehru’s previous actions had given him confidence that China would be ready to form an “Asian Axis” with India.
This apparent progress in relations suffered a major setback when, in 1959, Nehru accommodated the Tibetan religious leader at the time, the 14th Dalai Lama
, who fled Lhasa
after a failed Tibetan uprising
against Chinese rule. The Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong
, was enraged and asked the Xinhua News Agency
to produce reports on Indian expansionists operating in Tibet.
Border incidents continued through this period. In August 1959, the People’s Liberation Army
took an Indian prisoner at Longju, which had an ambiguous position in the McMahon Line,
and two months later in Aksai Chin, a clash led to the death of nine Indian frontier policemen.
On 2 October, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev
defended Nehru in a meeting with Mao. This action reinforced China’s impression that the Soviet Union, the United States and India all had expansionist
designs on China. The People’s Liberation Army went so far as to prepare a self-defence counterattack plan.
Negotiations were restarted between the nations, but no progress was made.
As a consequence of their non-recognition of the McMahon Line, China’s maps showed both the North East Frontier Area (NEFA) and Aksai Chin to be Chinese territory.
In 1960, Zhou Enlai unofficially suggested that India drop its claims to Aksai Chin in return for a Chinese withdrawal of claims over NEFA. Adhering to his stated position, Nehru believed that China did not have a legitimate claim over either of these territories, and thus was not ready to concede them. This adamant stance was perceived in China as Indian opposition to Chinese rule in Tibet.
Nehru declined to conduct any negotiations on the boundary until Chinese troops withdrew from Aksai Chin, a position supported by the international community.
India produced numerous reports on the negotiations, and translated Chinese reports into English to help inform the international debate. China believed that India was simply securing its claim lines in order to continue its “grand plans in Tibet”.
India’s stance that China withdraw from Aksai Chin caused continual deterioration of the diplomatic situation to the point that internal forces were pressuring Nehru to take a military stance against China.